Oct,1999
Shumpei Kumon
I am convinced that the 21st century will be the era when the importance of knowledge in human life will increase significantly. During this process three main trends will emerge:
１. Three Spheres of Human Life and Four Fields of Human Knowledge
In what follows I will elaborate on the points raised in the previous section. First, human life can tentatively be classified into three spheres:
Corresponding to this classification we can classify, again tentatively, the vast area of human knowledge into four fields:
Taking into consideration the fundamental feature of living/thinking systems that allows distinction of the world into self and others, technology in the above-defined sense can be further divided into:
My expectations for the next century's science and technology in this context are three-fold:
２. Three Hypotheses Concerning Today's Social Evolution
My arguments are based on the following three hypotheses concerning the evolution of human society:
During this dual process of evolution (informatization and information industry revolution) the social roles science and technology (or, for that matter, human knowledge in general) play will further increase.
When I talk about modern society I mean society based on the following three fundamental values (or cultures):
I would like to argue that through the third wave of modernization these three fundamental values will not disappear but will continue, though they will be further sophisticated and matured. That is to say, enlightened libertarianism will admit, if reluctantly, a certain constraint to the freedom of action, particularly with respect to the use of technology for free expression and persuasion. Flexible progressivism will agree to assert that no constant progress along a uniquely predetermined course is realizable. Finally, modest instrumentalism will be aware of the necessity and desirability of expanding knowledge of values.
３. Hypotheses on Overlapping Succession of Three Waves of Modernization
In retrospect, the historical process of modernization seems to suggest the existence of three overlapping succession of evolutionary waves: militarization, industrialization, and informatization.
Militarization, the first wave of modernization, was a co-evolutionary process of the modern sovereign state, the modern nation, and the international society. The modern sovereign states, based on the idea of sacred sovereignty as a public right, were engaged in a competitive social game. In doing so, they used their people (nation) as soldiers and diplomats. They also used international society as the arena of the game, the purpose of which was to maximize their power of threat and coercion (or, prestige). From another viewpoint, the arena of this prestige game can be regarded as the geopolitical space that each sovereign state endeavored to fill with its territories and colonies.
Industrialization, the second wave of modernization, was a co-evolutionary process of the modern industrial enterprise, the modern citizen, and the world marketplace. Modern industrial enterprises, based on the idea of sacred property ownership as a private right, were engaged in a different competitive social game. In doing so, they used their employees (citizen) as producers and sellers as well as consumers of goods and services that they provide. They also used the world marketplace as the arena of the game, of which the purpose was to maximize their power of exchange and exploitation (or, wealth). From another viewpoint, the arena of this wealth game can be regarded as the technological space that each industrial enterprise endeavored to fill with its artifacts (goods and services).
Similarly, today's informatization, the third wave of modernization, is a co-evolutionary process of the modern information "intelprise," the modern "netizen," and the "global intelplace". The modern information intelprises, based on the idea of sacred information right as a common right, are engaged in yet a third competitive social game. In doing so, they use their participants (netizen) as creators and disseminators as well as sharers of information and knowledge that they provide. They also use the global intelplace as the arena of the game, the purpose of which is to maximize their power of persuasion and inducement (or, wisdom). In this sense, today's Internet should be regarded as, above all, a concrete example of the global intelplace. From another viewpoint, the arena of the wisdom game can be regarded as the intellectual space that each information intelprise endeavors to fill with its "virtifacts" (virtual realities).
If these hypotheses hold good, then we may expect that the 21st century will be an era in which informatization rapidly proceeds with the rise of information intelprises and netizens. At the same time, the nature and role of sovereign states and industrial enterprises will inevitably change so that they may come to terms with the new evolutionary wave of informatization. Both existing states and enterprises and newly rising intelprises will seek to develop some kind and form of collaborative relationship, even though we cannot exclude the possibility of conflict between them. The latter possibility, unless duly controlled and confined, might lead to a political revolution (netizen revolution) comparable to past citizen revolutions and independence revolutions. Science and technology in the coming century will play a critical role in either promoting or avoiding such revolution.
４. Hypotheses on the Three Stages of Industrialization
The past history of industrialization seems to suggest that there has been an industrial revolution every one hundred years, starting around 1775. Moreover, each one hundred year long cycle of industrial revolution may be divided into two phases: a break-through phase and a maturation phase. The former phase gives rise to a series of new technologies, new industries, and new forms of industrial organization, whereas in the latter phase a new lifestyle is widely adopted by the public.
Thus the first industrial revolution (1775-1875), characterized by the wide use of steam-driven machines in production, was led, through its break-through phase, by light industries comprising a host of small-scale enterprises being engaged in free competition and controlled by an invisible hand. Its maturation phase was characterized by the spread of mass transportation and distribution (railways and steamships).
The second industrial revolution (1875-1975), characterized by the wide use of electric motors and internal combustion engines, was led, through its break-through phase, by heavy-chemical industries comprising relatively large-scale enterprises culminating in oligopolies and/or monopolies under strict government regulation. Its maturation phase was characterized by the penetration of machines into general consumers' hands.
I would like to argue that since the mid 1970s the modern industrial world has entered the stage of the third industrial revolution characterized by the wide use of information processing and transmitting machines. Its break-through phase is being led by info-communications industries comprising newly emerging networks of "virtual corporations." We can observe that the dominant form and principle of interaction for these corporations is collaboration rather than competition, or competition based on the common platforms and infrastructure.
Almost a quarter of a century has already passed since the break-through phase of the third industrial revolution began. This means that we are about to enter the second half of its break-through phase, and that the nature of technology as well as industry that leads through the rest of this phase can now be more clearly seen. For example, the paradigm of info-communications technology and industry is shifting from PC to networks. In other words, what George Gilder defined as the paradigm of microcosm is now trading places with what he defines as the paradigm of telecosm.
So far, science and technology in Japan have been too slow to come to grips with the advent of these new waves of informatization and the third industrial revolution. This may be due to Japan's success experiences in catching up during the maturation phase of the second industrial revolution, which made Japan too complacent to take current changes seriously. Moreover, the cultural traits of Japan that discourage risk-taking and failure may further exacerbate Japan's incompetence in achieving a break-through. Regardless, it is high time for Japan to face the new waves in earnest.
５. Formation of The Distributed Intellectual Network
It is highly likely that production of knowledge in the coming information society will take place in a new mode, or what Michael Gibbons named Mode 2.1 In other words, there will be formed a globally distributed intellectual network of which each node plays the role of distributed database unit and research unit. These nodes are capable of conducting autonomous intellectual activities, although they also will communicate and collaborate with one another. The most remarkable outcome of this intellectual network will be in that it has a rich inventory of applications based on globally agreed upon standard formats and languages for creation, transmission, presentation, analysis, and searching of data, information, and knowledge. It also will have global as well as local schemes for decision-making and collaboration with respect to what kind of data, information, and knowledge should or could be created and shared by each node.
Such a network will be constructed and used by what I called netizens, that is, ordinary people in the information society. Just as people in the military society fought for the sovereign state as soldiers and enjoyed the prestige its states acquired, and just as citizens in the industrial society worked for industrial enterprises as workers and consumed the goods and services sold by these enterprises, netizens in the information society will act as creators of knowledge for information intelprises and will share the information and knowledge disseminated by these intelprises.
This will imply a drastic change in the roles of producers and distributors in the information society. In the industrial society, knowledge -- especially science and technology -- is produced by a relatively small number of professional intellectual artisans such as scholars, artists, and engineers, and mainly is distributed by the mass-media, big oligopolistic industrial enterprises. In the information society, however, these roles will be occupied by a huge number of ordinary netizens belonging to the distributed intellectual network. Thus information and knowledge will abound and will be shared more or less freely. Today's internet does in fact represent a primitive form of such a distributed intellectual network. It is easy for intellectual artisans to criticize the average low quality of information and knowledge spontaneously posted and freely shared on the internet. But eventually the internet, or its more developed version, will replace, if not completely, existing systems of knowledge production and distribution. Moreover, just as the military society developed its own systems for military education of its members thus producing new types of military professionals, and just as the industrial society developed its own systems for professional education of its members thus producing new types of professionals in business, law, and medicine, the information society will develop its own systems for professional training of its members. Eventually there will emerge a host of new (and virtual?) research, educational, and/or learning institutions enforcing reform and transformation for survival on incumbent research and educational institutions.
In conclusion, I would like to advocate the necessity and desirability for incumbent intellectual professionals and institutions to discard their prejudices, if any, against the internet and netizens and to be ready to collaborate with them.
1 Michael Gibbons, The New Production of Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science and Research in Contemporary Societies. London: Sage Publications, 1994.
S. Kumon